Black Basta Exposed: Anatomy of a Relentless Ransomware Threat

March 19, 2025

Overview of Black Basta

Black Basta is a rapidly evolving Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group that has made a formidable impact since its emergence in April 2022. Unlike traditional ransomware campaigns that rely on mass deployment, Black Basta employs a highly targeted approach, using sophisticated techniques like phishing, Qakbot malware, Cobalt Strike and known vulnerability exploits to infiltrate networks. Once inside, the attackers move swiftly, identifying critical data before deploying the ransomware and leveraging double extortion; demanding ransom not only for decryption but also to prevent the release of stolen data.  

Black Basta Ransomware affiliates have breached over 500 organizations globally, impacting at least 12 of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors, including healthcare. The group has received at least $107 million in ransom payments since early 2022, with the largest payment being $9 million.  

Security researchers believe that Black Basta may have ties to the notorious Conti ransomware group, possibly as an offshoot. Additionally, the financially driven cybercrime group FIN7 has been linked to Black Basta due to similarities in attack methods, tools, and infrastructure. Evidence suggests that some Black Basta affiliates rely on malware and techniques previously associated with FIN7. Another threat group, Dark Scorpius, has also been connected to Black Basta, with recent campaigns showing infrastructure usage linked to its affiliates. Furthermore, Storm-1811, also referred to as the Cardinal cybercrime group, has been identified as a key actor deploying Black Basta ransomware, leveraging social engineering and known exploits to carry out attacks.

Targeted Industries: Energy, Agriculture, Transportation, Government, Real Estate, Insurance, Healthcare, Finance, Food & Beverage, Civil Aviation, Manufacturing, Mining, Chemical, Construction, Oil & Gas, Logistic, Defense, Legal and Information Technology.  

Targeted Regions: United States, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, France, Netherlands, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Denmark, Belgium, Brazil, Finland, India, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Puerto Rico, Slovenia and Spain.  

Technical Analysis

Initial Access

Black Basta affiliates employ multiple tactics to gain initial access to target networks, primarily using spear phishing and malware like Qakbot, which delivers a malicious link or attachment to the victim.  In a notable social engineering campaign, attackers bombarded users with spam emails from legitimate sources such as website registrations and marketing subscriptions. Following this, they impersonated technical support representatives, calling victims to offer assistance and persuading them to install remote access tools like AnyDesk or Microsoft’s Quick Assist.  

Additionally, Black Basta threat actors leverage Initial Access Brokers (IABs) to acquire stolen credentials. IABs scan networks for vulnerabilities and sell access to compromised systems in underground forums, allowing threat actors to infiltrate enterprise networks and maintain persistent access.

Execution

Once initial access is gained, Black Basta affiliates execute their malware using malicious files embedded in downloaded ZIP archives. These archives often contain either a shortcut (.lnk) file or an Excel document designed to deploy Qakbot malware. When executed, the malicious Excel file triggers the download and execution of Qakbot, which then runs specific PowerShell commands as part of its staging phase.  

Persistence

Black Basta established persistence by creating new system services and executing deceptive batch scripts disguised as legitimate updates. These scripts facilitated ongoing access while also enabling the exfiltration of credentials.

Privilege Escalation

Black Basta affiliates escalated privileges by utilizing credential scraping tools like Mimikatz. Additionally, they exploited known vulnerabilities such as ZeroLogon, NoPac, and PrintNightmare to gain elevated access within local systems and Windows Active Directory domains.  

Defense Evasion

Black Basta employed multiple techniques to evade detection and disable security defenses before deploying ransomware. The group used batch scripts containing PowerShell commands to disable antimalware applications and leveraged Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to deactivate Windows Defender and Security Center. To bypass security measures, the affiliates rebooted victim computers in safe mode, ensuring that antivirus programs remained inactive.  

Additionally, the attackers carried out reconnaissance using tools masked with innocuous file names like "Intel" or "Dell" to blend in with legitimate software and evade suspicion. They also deployed a custom tool known as Backstab, designed specifically to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) systems, further reducing the likelihood of detection.

Credential Access

Black Basta affiliates utilized Mimikatz to extract credentials from LSASS memory, allowing them to gain access to sensitive login information. With the stolen credentials, the ransomware operators moved laterally across the network, progressively compromising systems until they achieved partial or complete control over the target environment.  

Discovery

Black Basta employed various tools and techniques to gather information on compromised systems and networks. The affiliates used PowerShell scripts to conduct system reconnaissance, while also leveraging Qakbot and Cobeacon's information-gathering capabilities to scan the affected environment.  

Additionally, they utilized third-party tools like Netcat to analyze network activity and the SoftPerfect Network Scanner to collect critical details, including hostnames, available network services, and remote access protocols. This thorough reconnaissance enabled Black Basta affiliates to map out the network, identify key assets, and plan their next steps for further exploitation and ransomware deployment.  

Lateral Movement

The tools and techniques used to navigate within compromised networks include:  

Command and Control

To maintain control over compromised systems, Black Basta utilized a range of tools and techniques:  

Exfiltration and Impact

After identifying and gathering sensitive files, affiliates utilize tools like RClone and WinSCP to transfer stolen data out of the compromised network. Once exfiltration is complete, the ransomware executes its encryption process using ChaCha 20 algorithm with an RSA-4096 public key ensuring that files become inaccessible. Encrypted files are then appended with a .basta extension and a ransom note titled "readme.txt" is placed on the affected system.  

To further disrupt recovery efforts, the ransomware deploys vssadmin.exe to delete volume shadow copies, preventing victims from restoring their files. This sequence of exfiltration, encryption, and system manipulation enforces Black Basta’s double extortion strategy, where victims must pay not only to regain access to their data but also to prevent the public release of stolen information.    

Ransom note of Black Basta Ransomware
Tool Name Description Usage
AnyDesk A remote desktop application that allows users to securely access and control computers from anywhere over the internet Used to remotely access and control a victim's endpoint.
Microsoft Teams A collaboration and communication platform that enables chat, video conferencing, file sharing and teamwork in one integrated space Abused by Black Basta affiliates to communicate directly with employees during attacks.
Microsoft Quick Assist Used to remotely access and assist another user's computer to help troubleshoot issues Used to gain unauthorized access to a victim's endpoint.
BITSAdmin A command-line tool used to create, manage and monitor Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) Abused by Black Basta affiliates for Lateral movement
Cobalt Strike A penetration testing tool designed to test security of the networks and systems Abused by Black Basta affiliates for Lateral movement and file execution
Mimikatz A tool used for storing Kerberos tickets from memory on Windows systems Abused by Black Basta affiliates for Privilege Escalation
PSExec A utility built to execute programs and commands on remote systems Abused by Black Basta affiliates for Lateral movement
PowerShell A command-line shell and scripting language used for automating tasks Use of PowerShell command to disable antimalware applications
RClone A command-line tool used to synchronize files with cloud storage services like Mega Used to enable data exfiltration before encryption
SoftPerfect A network scanner used to ping devices, scan ports, identify shared folders, and gather network information Abused to conduct network scanning
ScreenConnect A remote desktop and remote support tool that allows to access and control computers over the internet for IT support Used for Lateral movement and remote access
Splashtop A remote desktop solution that enables access to devices for support, management, and collaboration Used for Lateral movement and remote access
WinSCP A Windows tool used for securely transferring files between local and remote systems using SFTP, FTP, SCP, and WebDAV. Used to exfiltrate data from compromised networks to attacker-controlled accounts
Image illustrating tools used by Black Basta Ransomware

From Ransom to Ruin: Unmasking Recent Moves and Internal Chaos

  1. Collaboration with Cactus Ransomware
    One of the most significant developments in late 2024 is the adoption of BackConnect (BC), a powerful remote access tool (RAT). BackConnect allows attackers to establish covert communication channels, even bypassing firewalls and other network security measures, giving them real-time control over compromised systems. This advancement significantly strengthens Black Basta's capabilities, enabling them to remain undetected for extended periods, escalate attacks, exfiltrate sensitive data, and deploy ransomware more effectively.

    An interesting and critical observation is that Black Basta and CACTUS ransomware groups are now using the same BackConnect module, which suggests a possible collaboration or shared development effort between these cybercriminal groups. This overlap raises the possibility that affiliates or operators might be switching between ransomware families or that both groups are leveraging a common toolset developed by a third-party provider within the cybercrime ecosystem.

    In addition to technical enhancements, Black Basta has increasingly turned to advanced social engineering tactics to facilitate initial access. The group has been observed conducting email bombing campaigns and impersonating IT support teams to deceive targets. By posing as internal IT personnel, attackers have successfully manipulated users into installing legitimate remote access tools such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, or Windows Quick Assist, granting attackers direct access to corporate environments.
  2. Internal Chat Leaks
    The recent leaks of Black Basta's internal communications, covering conversations from September 2023 to September 2024, have shed light on the group's internal dynamics, operational methods, and growing instability. These chat logs reveal a leadership structure marred by disputes and distrust, particularly highlighting figures like "Lapa" and "YY", who handle key administrative roles under significant pressure and receive limited compensation. Notably, the group's leader, Oleg Nefedov (also known by aliases such as "Trump", "Bio" and "GG"), appears to prioritize personal gain over collective interests, causing rifts within the group. Their operational focus includes social engineering campaigns led by members like "Nur", targeting high-value industries such as energy, industrial supply chains, and financial management, with an emphasis on VPN exploits and sophisticated access techniques.  

    The leaks also confirm Black Basta' collaboration with other groups like CACTUS and mention Dispossessor's attempt to join them, though met with suspicion over potential law enforcement ties. The exposure of a 17-year-old affiliate, interest in high-cost private loaders, and use of victim spreadsheets for coordinated attacks reflect the group's organized yet fractured nature. Their declining activity in 2025 exacerbated by internal scams, betrayals, and defections to rival groups like CACTUS, underscores the growing disarray within Black Basta following public scrutiny and law enforcement pressure.

Known Vulnerabilities leveraged by Black Basta

CVE-ID Vendor Product Description
CVE-2024-1708 ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Vulnerability in ConnectWise ScreenConnect
CVE-2024-1709 ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass Vulnerability in ConnectWise ScreenConnect
CVE-2024-26169 Microsoft Windows Error Reporting (WER) Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability in Windows Error Reporting Service
CVE-2024-37085 VMware ESXi Hypervisor Authentication Bypass vulnerability in VMware ESXi which can result in the attacker taking complete control of the affected system
CVE-2023-28252 Microsoft Windows Common Log File System Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Windows Common Log File System Driver
CVE-2021-34527 Microsoft Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in Windows Print Spooler
CVE-2021-42278 Microsoft Windows Active Directory Domain Services Improper Privilege Management Vulnerability in Active Directory Domain Services
CVE-2021-42287 Microsoft Windows Active Directory Domain Services Privilege Escalation Vulnerability in Microsoft Windows Active Directory Domain Services
CVE-2020-1472 Microsoft Windows Server (Netlogon Remote Protocol) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability in Microsoft Netlogon
CVE-2019-16098 Micro-Star International MSI Afterburner Improper privilege management in driver in Micro-Star MSI Afterburner

Black Basta Techniques mapped to MITRE ATT&CK

ID Technique Usage
Initial Access
T1566 Phishing Black Basta affiliates gained initial access by leveraging spearphishing emails to deceive and compromise their targets.
T1566.004 Phishing: Spearphishing Voice Black Basta affiliates exploited spearphishing phone calls and Microsoft Teams messages to deceive users and gain initial access to targeted systems.
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Black Basta affiliates leveraged known exploitable vulnerabilities to gain initial access to targeted systems.
T1078 Valid Accounts Black Basta affiliates have been reported purchasing compromised accounts from underground forums to gain unauthorized access to victim systems.
Execution
T1204 User Execution Black Basta affiliates employed social engineering tactics to manipulate users into installing legitimate remote access tools like AnyDesk and Microsoft’s Quick Assist.
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell Black Basta affiliates leveraged PowerShell to disable antivirus protections on compromised systems.
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation Black Basta affiliates have been observed using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to spread and execute files across the network.
Persistence
T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service Black Basta affiliates have been observed creating or modifying Windows services to maintain persistence and execute malicious processes on compromised systems.
Privilege Escalation
T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Black Basta affiliates have utilized credential scraping tools to escalate privileges within compromised networks.
Defense Evasion
T1036 Masquerading Black Basta affiliates have carried out reconnaissance using utilities disguised with innocuous file names, such as Intel or Dell, to evade detection.
T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools Black Basta affiliates have utilized a tool known as Backstab to disable Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) systems, evading security measures.
T1562.009 Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot Black Basta affiliates have disabled Windows recovery and repair features and forced the system to restart in safe mode to evade security defenses.
T1112 Modify Registry Black Basta affiliates have modified registry entries to change the desktop wallpaper, set custom icons for encrypted files, establish persistence, and disable security defenses.
T1484.001 Domain Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification Black Basta affiliates have leveraged Group Policy Objects (GPOs) on compromised domain controllers to propagate changes across domain-joined hosts, modifying the Windows registry to disable security defenses.
T1620 Reflective Code Loading Black Basta affiliates have been observed using reflective code loading to execute their ransomware while evading detection and security defenses.
Credential Access
T1003 OS Credential Dumping Black Basta affiliates have utilized Mimikatz to access credentials via a cache.
T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Black Basta affiliates have been observed requesting Kerberos service tickets after escalating privileges.
T1555 Credentials from Password Stores Black Basta affiliates used Mimikatz to dump passwords.
Discovery
T1135 Network Share Discovery Black Basta affiliates have leveraged Qakbot to execute the net share command, allowing them to identify available network shares for lateral movement within compromised environments.
T1082 System Information Discovery Black Basta affiliates have been observed using GetComputerName to query the computer name of a compromised system.
T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery Black Basta affiliates have been observed listing internal IP addresses in C:\Windows\pc_list.txt, typically located on a Domain Controller.
T1482 Domain Trust Discovery Black Basta affiliates have been observed using Qakbot to execute the nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts command, allowing them to enumerate domain trust relationships.
T1083 File and Directory Discovery Black Basta affiliates scan for targeted files and directories to prioritize for encryption.
T1018 Remote System Discovery Black Basta affiliates leverage LDAP queries to connect to Active Directory and enumerate connected workstations
Lateral Movement
T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol Black Basta affiliates leveraged RDP for lateral movement across the network
Collection
T1005 Data from Local System Black Basta affiliates exfiltrated files and sensitive data from compromised networks
T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility Black Basta affiliates compressed collected files before encryption
Command and Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols Black Basta affiliates leveraged QakBot, which used HTTP and HTTPS for communication with C&C servers
T1219 Remote Access Software Black Basta affiliates installed and used legitimate tools like TeamViewer and AnyConnect on compromised systems
T1573 Encrypted Channel Black Basta affiliates used QakBot, BRUTEL, and Cobalt Strike for encrypted communication
Impact
T1489 Service Stop Black Basta affiliates used 'sc stop' and 'taskkill' commands to terminate services.
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact Black Basta affiliates used a public key to fully encrypt files.
T1490 Inhibit System Recovery Black Basta affiliates used vssadmin.exe to delete shadow copies.
Image illustrating effective defense mechanisms against Black Basta ransomware

Final Takeaway

The recent leaks from Black Basta highlights a dangerous shift in ransomware operations, attackers are moving from initial access to full network compromise in a matter of hours, sometimes minutes. This rapid escalation leaves organizations with virtually no time to react, making proactive defense more critical than ever. Black Basta's tactics, including credential dumping, disabling security tools, and fast ransomware deployment, show how quickly a threat actor can cripple an environment. To stay ahead of such threats, organizations must focus on minimizing the attack surface, patching known vulnerabilities, and strengthening their defenses before attacker's strike.

Sources Cited:

  1. https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/b/black-basta-cactus-ransomware-backconnect.html
  2. https://www.securityweek.com/black-basta-leak-offers-glimpse-into-groups-inner-workings/
  3. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-131a
  4. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-assessment-black-basta-ransomware/
  5. https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2024/09/19/black-basta-ransomware-what-you-need-to-know  
  6. https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/in/security/news/ransomware-spotlight/ransomware-spotlight-blackbasta  
  7. https://www.sentinelone.com/anthology/black-basta/  
  8. https://www.tatacommunications.com/knowledge-base/guide-to-black-basta-ransomware/  
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  10. https://flashpoint.io/blog/understanding-black-basta-ransomware/  
  11. https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/black-basta-ransomware-analysis-cisa-alert-aa24-131a  
  12. https://x.com/vxunderground/status/1892830063365697685  
  13. https://x.com/3xp0rtblog/status/1892583537879994632  
  14. https://www.securityweek.com/black-basta-leak-offers-glimpse-into-groups-inner-workings/  
  15. https://x.com/PRODAFT/status/1892636346885235092  
  16. https://vulncheck.com/blog/black-basta-chats  
  17. https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2025/02/25/defense-lessons-from-the-black-basta-ransomware-playbook  
  18. https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/black-basta-technical-analysis  

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